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Abstract 
After witnessing an event, a witness may be exposed to additional details about the event.  
These details can be inaccurate and delivered by numerous sources including other witnesses, 
law enforcement, and news reports. The purpose of this study was to examine how such post-
event details can influence eyewitness memory reports, specifically when the post-event 
details are delivered by individuals from a social in-group or social out-group. Participants 
were young and older adults who were paired with a fictional partner. The fictional partner 
was manipulated to appear a member of the same racial group or a different racial group.  
Participant and partner pairs completed a social memory task in which the partner introduced 
false details to the participants. The results of the study were consistent with past research 
that has been done, indicating that older adults typically have a worse memory compared to 
young adults. It was further demonstrated that older adults are more susceptible to false 
memory formation than young adults, especially when false information is socially presented. 
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Age Differences in False Memory 
Imagine one night, your grandmother is woken by rustling in her kitchen. Alarmed, she goes 
to investigate. As she makes her way to the kitchen, she sees a heavyset White male wearing 
a black hooded sweatshirt running to his car and speeding down the road. Her neighbor is on 
the sidewalk calling the police, making her and your grandmother the only eyewitnesses 
available to testify if a suspect is caught. Due to this, the pressure is on your grandmother to 
make sure her memory is accurate so that the correct person is convicted. The police officer 
asks your grandmother for her  report of the incident and makes remarks such as “I would 
imagine he was a young, athletic man judging by how fast he escaped from your house.” 
Later that day, her neighbor mentions while they are discussing the event: “I think he was 
wearing a blue shirt with stripes on it. Who knows though, it was dark out.” When your 
grandmother testifies at a later time, will her memory for the event be consistent with what 
she witnessed, or will her reports be contaminated by the suggestive information given by the 
police and neighbor? While the previous example may seem unrealistic, it is relatively 
common for individuals to be wrongly accused of actions due to errors in eyewitness 
memory. Due to errors such as this, the Innocence Project was founded in 1992, which is a 
non-profit legal organization that is committed to exonerating wrongly convicted people 
(Innocence Project, n.d). The organization does this through DNA testing and to reform the 
justice system in order to prevent future wrongdoings. Through the work of the Innocence 
Project, it has been estimated that between 2.3% and 5% of all prisoners are innocent, and 
that the leading cause of wrongful convictions is faulty eyewitness testimony (Innocence 
Project, n.d).   
  The majority of what we know about how misleading suggestions have the ability to 
impact eyewitness memory has been gained from laboratory studies using paradigms such as 
the misinformation effect paradigm and the social contagion paradigm. The misinformation 
AGE DIFFERENCES IN FALSE MEMORY  4 
 
effect is observed when an individual incorporates inaccurate post-event information that has 
been suggested to them from an external source such as a summary statement or misleading 
questions (Loftus, 1999). These misleading suggestions interfere with the original memory of 
a witnessed event. In the initial example, I described a scenario where your memory was 
susceptible to misleading information that was given by the officer. The social contagion 
paradigm is a similar approach used by researchers to investigate specifically how different 
social interactions can influence eyewitness memory (Roediger et al.,2001). In the earlier 
example, this paradigm is a parallel to the part of the scenario where the neighbor introduced 
you to false information during the course of a neighbor-to-neighbor social interaction.  This 
social contagion effect, or finding that exposure to misinformation about an event introduced 
by a co-witness during an interaction, has been studied multiple times, which continues to 
prove the strength of this memory distortion (Meade & Roediger, 2002).  
The present study is designed to explore how the impact of external suggestion on 
eyewitness memory differs across age groups particularly within the context of the social 
contagion paradigm. It will be an initial exploration of how the social dynamic of a cross-
group interaction may influence eyewitness memory. In a co-witness reporting design, 
confederates will be introduced to false details about a witnessed event. The confederates will 
be the same age or same race as the participants (same-group interactions) or a different age 
or different race (cross-group interactions). While previous work has indicated that 
confederate age can influence the social contagion effect (e. g., Davis & Meade, 2013), the 
impact of cross-race interactions has not been studied. Thus, we will observe whether the 
race, age, or both factors combined will influence later incorrect reporting of the suggested 
details.   
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Memory and Aging 
 As people age, there are various aspects of life that begin to change, one of them 
being one’s memory. Memory can be broadly defined as the ability to take in new 
information, store information in the human brain, and use the stored information to recall 
past experiences. The ways in which these abilities could change over time was thought about 
as early as 700 BC when a Greek philosopher began to realize that his intellectual capacities 
began to diminish between the ages of 56-63 (Park & Festini, 2016). A Roman poet discussed 
the degradation of memory over time as he wrote “Time robs us of all, even of memory” 
(Park & Festini, 2016). Some of the earliest experimental findings with age differences began 
with differences in verbal learning paradigms. In 1929, a researcher documented age-related 
differences in memory for digit-symbol pairs (Park & Festini, 2016). It was demonstrated that 
adults between the ages of 60-82 exhibited worse memory than those of 34-59, with people 
aged 12-17 having the best memory performance (Park & Festini, 2016; Kausler, 1991). 
Other early findings suggested that older adults were less likely to use imagery or create 
memory strategies when trying to remember paired associates, compared to younger adults 
(Park & Festini, 2016). The study of memory and age has gained significance over the years 
in order to better understand the process and its repercussions.  
 As early as the 1960s, researchers began to discover that participants demonstrated 
increasingly slower processing time for an extensive range of cognitive tasks with older age 
(Park & Festini; Birren, 1965). This resulted in the hypothesis that slowed processing speed 
was a result of age deficits, including memory. The researcher Salthouse (1996), proposed 
that older adults are deficient in two important mechanisms that are correlated with age-
related differences in attention, memory and reasoning. The first idea was that older adults 
have an increased difficulty with performing higher level tasks since they take a longer time 
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to process the earlier operation. Secondly, they are unable to consider as many task-relevant 
components together compared with younger adults (Salthouse, 1996). 
Since these early findings, research has shown significant evidence to demonstrate 
that memory is not a single function. Instead, it may be described in terms of different 
memory systems that all have different aging effects (Luo & Craik, 2008). One type of 
memory is explicit memory, which are memories that can be intentionally and consciously 
recalled. For example, your memory of riding a bike, falling over the handlebars and skinning 
your knee would be an explicit memory. The other type of memory is implicit memory, 
which is a form of memory that cannot be consciously recalled, for example motor and 
muscle memory needed to keep balance in order to know how to ride a bike. Explicit, 
conscious, memory can be further divided into two categories: semantic and episodic 
memory. Semantic memory involves recalling facts and figures such as your date of birth or 
your mother’s maiden name. In contrast, episodic memory is more of a subjective experience, 
going beyond fact to include context, sensory information, emotion and other 
autobiographical elements. (Dickerson & Eichenbaum, 2009). Episodic memories can be 
compared to episodes of a TV series that is about you. You can recall the “episode” of the 
first time you asked someone out, your favorite trip to the amusement park from two years 
ago, and what you ate for breakfast yesterday. Episodic memories can also be much more 
significant. For example, in investigative procedures eyewitnesses are called upon to provide 
testimony on their episodic memory, and errors can literally have life-changing consequences 
for multiple parties in these scenarios.  
It is generally understood that semantic and episodic memory are distinct from one 
another, but highly interacting and share at least some neurological underpinnings (Renoult & 
Rugg, 2020). Episodic memory is supported by the medial temporal lobe (MTL), which 
includes the hippocampus (Dickerson & Eichenbaum, 2009). The hippocampus appears to be 
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critical for both short-term and long-term episodic memory (Dennis et al., 2008). The 
hippocampus importantly interacts with multiple cortical and subcortical structures. Various 
studies on both animals and humans have been performed that show that cortical components 
of this system have valuable functions in aspects of perception and cognition. The MTL is 
responsible for mediating the organization of memories, where the details are stored in these 
cortical areas (Dickerson & Eichenbaum, 2009). The prefrontal cortex also plays a role in 
episodic memory. The prefrontal cortex houses our executive functions, which are the 
abilities to engage in self-regulation and inhibition. Executive functions play a role in 
episodic memory by allowing people to mentally “time travel” and connect experiences to the 
appropriate context (Wheeler et al., 1997).  When there is damage to the hippocampus, MTL 
or the prefrontal cortex structures of the memory system due to deterioration or damage, there 
is seen to be a compromise in episodic memory. 
 Although there is debate in the field as to what developmental time period different 
types of memory begin to decline, many researchers agree that  semantic memories tend to 
stay relatively stable, however episodic memories become increasingly more difficult to 
create and maintain as we age (Salthouse, 2009). It is suggested that the decline in episodic 
memory is  attributable to age-related changes in the MTL and the prefrontal cortex (PFC) 
(Devitt & Schachter, 2016; Schacter et al., 1997). These changes would make older adults 
particularly vulnerable to various episodic memory errors, such as those that could be made 
in an eyewitness memory scenario (cf., Thomas et al., 2014). For example, consider the 
earlier example of witnessing a burglar running away from your grandmother’s house.  If she 
later testified that she remembered an athletic male with a striped shirt, she would be 
committing an episodic memory error by incorporating external suggestions into her reports.   
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Understanding False Memory 
 It is a common misconception that episodic memory works like a video recording. 
However, decades of research have found that our memory is notoriously untrustworthy.  
 Although witnesses can often be very confident that their memory is accurate when 
identifying a suspect, the malleable nature of human memory and visual perception makes 
eyewitness testimony one of the most unreliable forms of evidence. Research has been 
directed at understanding the factors that can contribute to faulty episodic memory, 
particularly in contexts where an individual is witness to an accident or crime such as in the 
earlier anecdote. While this is a very important topic to study, it is a challenging one because 
studying eyewitness memory for real crimes is nearly impossible. This is because crime 
scenes are not a situation that can be experimentally controlled. Due to this difficulty, a 
number of lab paradigms have been developed that have allowed researchers to learn more 
about the conditions that are most or least likely to lead to faulty eyewitness memories as 
well as demographic groups that are most susceptible to false memories, and the neurological 
substrates that underlie these memory processes. Across a number of these paradigms, age 
related differences in false memory have been observed with cognitive aging associated with 
increased susceptibility to various kinds of false recollections (Schacter et al., 1997). 
Specifically, research has found that when comparing young and older adults in regard to true 
and false memories on recall and recognition tasks, older adults typically show a reduction in 
true memories, and an increase in false memories, and further that they have difficulties 
recollecting the source of information, which makes them vulnerable to confusing perceived 
and imagined experiences as well as memory distortions on a number of different types of 
tasks as will shortly be discussed. 
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Aging and False Memory 
Previous studies examining false memories and aging have shown that these 
memories are more likely to occur when new items share perceptual or semantic similarities 
with those presented during encoding. These discoveries are further investigated on a 
neurobiological level using functional magnetic resonance imaging and a false memory task 
(Dennis et al., 2008). This was done by scanning young and older participants during a word 
recognition task using the DRM paradigm. The DRM paradigm (see Roediger & McDermott, 
1995 and further discussion below) is commonly used to study false memory creation, with a 
methodology that requires participants to study lists of semantically related words and then 
take memory tests on the lists.  Dennis et al. (2008) presented participants with a recognition 
task that included studied words and new words referred to as critical lures (Dennis et al., 
2008). During correct recognition of studied words, known as true memory, older adults 
showed weaker activity than young adults in the hippocampus but stronger activity than 
young adults in the retrosplenial cortex (Dennis et al., 2008). These hippocampal reduction 
findings are consistent with age-related deficits in recollection. The increase in the 
retrosplenial cortex shows that the older adults relied on alternative recollection-related 
regions, due to their decline in other brain regions (Dennis et al., 2008). When investigating 
incorrect recognition of critical lures, or false memories, older adults displayed stronger 
activity than younger adults in the left lateral temporal cortex. This region is involved in 
semantic processing, demonstrating that older adults have a decline in recollection processes, 
which is mediated by the hippocampus (Dennis et al., 2008). Their increased tendency to 
have false memory shows their reliance on semantic processing.  
Magnetic resonance further allowed researchers to measure the volume of brain 
structures in older adults and to relate the results to memory performance. Raz et al. (1998) 
performed research demonstrating that older adults with smaller brain volume in their 
AGE DIFFERENCES IN FALSE MEMORY  10 
 
hippocampal region, tended to have impaired explicit memory. There was further analysis of 
white matter integrity in the brain, which revealed poorer memory in older adults with 
hyperintensity of the matter (DeCarli et al., 1995; Van Petten, 2004). These structural 
methods were able to be further observed with diffusion tensor imaging, which helped to 
draw conclusions about brain structure and memory performance.  
There have been further biological factors that have been recently explored such as 
the development of in vivo β-amyloid and tau imaging, which help researchers to explore the 
relationship between neuropathological insults and the correlation to one’s memory. Through 
these experiments, it has been seen that greater levels of amyloid have been associated with 
worse episodic memory (Hedden et al., 2013) as well as deficits in cognition and altered 
patterns of activation with memory encoding (Mormino et al., 2012). The results of these 
types of imaging is very up-and-coming, however, future work will help researchers to better 
understand neuropathology with both typical and atypical memory performance, false 
memories that occur in contexts similar to those that represent eyewitness scenarios (Park & 
Festini, 2016).  
 
Laboratory Paradigms to Study Faulty Eyewitness Memory 
The DRM Paradigm. The Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm was 
created in order to study false memories in a controlled, scientific setting (Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995). This paradigm relied upon associative memory, which is the ability to 
learn and remember the relationship between items. Through this study, subjects studied lists 
of 12 words which were composed of semantic associates (e.g., bed, rest, awake), and one 
non-presented word (e.g., sleep) (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). When the participants were 
given immediate free recall tests, the non-presented associates were recalled about 40% of 
the time and were recognized in the future with confidence (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). 
In the following experiment, a false recall rate of 55% was reported when an expanded set of 
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lists was used. The results of this paradigm demonstrated a powerful illusion of memory, 
showing how people remember events that never actually occurred simply by being exposed 
to related information. This happens since these false memories are generated through 
automatic associations that are seen within the given words and the non-presented word.  
Individuals making errors on this task may have trouble distinguishing between actual 
recollection and a more subjective feeling of familiarity generated from association.  
The Misinformation Effect Paradigm. More relevant to the idea of eyewitness 
memory, Loftus and Palmer (1974) were interested in examining whether memory for a 
fictional event could be manipulated by verbal suggestions. This experiment involved 
subjects viewing films of automobile accidents and then answering questions. One critical 
question varied between participants. Some participants were asked the question “About how 
fast were the cars going when they smashed into each other?”, while other participants were 
asked the same question with the word smashed replaced by terms such as collided or 
bumped (Loftus & Palmer, 1974). Interestingly, participants who were exposed to smashed 
reported higher estimates of speed than participants in the other conditions. The subjects were 
retested a week later and the participants who received the verb “smashed” were more likely 
to answer “yes” to the question, “Did you see any broken glass?”, even though there was no 
broken glass present (Loftus & Palmer, 1974). Through this study, it was demonstrated that 
questions asked subsequent to an event can lead to reconstruction in one’s memory of an 
event.  
In follow up work, Loftus and colleagues developed a slightly different method which 
is known as the misinformation effect paradigm.  This paradigm extended the work of Loftus 
and Palmer (1974) by demonstrating that not only can memory be altered by leading 
suggestions, but outright false suggestions can also alter eyewitness memory when delivered 
through leading questions or post-event information (Loftus, Miller and Burns, 1978).  
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            After engaging in various types of research regarding false memory, Loftus 
investigated the possibility of implanting an entire false memory into the minds of people for 
events that never occurred in an ethically permissible way. When exploring this idea, her 
research partner assembled booklets that had four short narratives that each described 
childhood events. The partner’s family were enrolled in the study and were asked to 
remember as many details as possible from each of the stories (Loftus and Pickrell, 1995). 
The participants were unaware that one of the stories was false, where the false story 
described a scene of their younger brother getting lost in a shopping mall (Loftus and 
Pickrell, 1995). Throughout the experiment, the younger brother was asked to describe the 
stories he read in which he began to incorporate the false story into his reports, while also 
inventing his own details into the story. The conclusion of the experiment involved the 
participants being told that there was a false story incorporated, in which the younger brother 
was unable to identify which story was false (Loftus and Pickrell, 1995). 
 Loftus and Pickrell (1995) then performed a formal study adapted from the original 
Lost in the Mall experiment. This study asked the same question, which was whether people 
could be led to believe that they had been lost in a shopping mall as a child even if they had 
not been. At the conclusion of the study, about 25% of the participants reported remembering 
a false event (Loftus and Pickrell, 1995). Similarly to the prior study, the participants were 
then told that one of the given events was false. With this, some participants failed to identify 
the incorrect event and rather selected one of the true events to be false. This study is referred 
to as “existence proof” for false memory creation while also providing evidence that false 
memory can be formed from a suggested event being incorporated into existing memories 
(Loftus and Pickrell, 1995).  
In the typical misinformation experiment, there is no direct social presence. 
Misleading information is typically delivered in an impersonal written form, either embedded 
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in questions that are assumed to have come from the experimenter or in a detailed narrative 
from a supposed observer of the original event. In either case, subjects may expect that 
information placed in the questions or narrative is correct, because either the experimenter 
presented the information, or a person that is able to remember details did (Meade & 
Roediger, 2002) (Loftus, 1993). This is important to understand in order to differentiate from 
the social contagion paradigm used in the present study.   
The Social Contagion Paradigm. Contrary to the process used in the misinformation 
effect paradigm, the misleading information is provided to subjects directly by confederates 
who seem, to the actual subject, to be in the same situation during recall. A related false 
memory paradigm was developed by Roediger and colleagues which involved the use of a 
confederate. A confederate is an individual(s) who appears to be a fellow participant, but in 
reality serves a purpose for the research team. The researchers performed four experiments to 
examine social influence on false memories where subject and confederate pairs together 
studied six common household scenes, such as a kitchen (Roediger et al., 2001). Each pair 
then participated in a collaborative recall test, where each individual took turns recalling 
items from each of the scenes. During this collaborative recall task, the confederate reported 
incorrect items that were not present in the actual scene, but were plausible, for half of the 
scenes. These scenes were referred to as contagion scenes. The other half of the scenes served 
as control scenes.  The scenes that served as contagion and control were counterbalanced 
across participants. Memory on control scenes was important because it served as a way to 
measure spontaneous reports of each the items suggested on contagion scenes in the absence 
of suggestion. Soon after, the individual subject took an individual memory test where they 
recalled as many items as possible from each of the six original scenes, and then a 
recognition test where they were exposed to both studied, suggested, and new items and had 
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to attribute each item to its correct source - either the scenes, the confederate, both the scenes 
and confederate, or that is was a new item.  
The results of the study showed what is termed the social contagion of memory effect. 
The researchers analyzed the recall and recognition tests to estimate the impact of the 
confederate’s inaccurate suggestions on participants’ memory. On the recall test, recall of 
critical items was greater on contagion compared to control scenes. Further, on the source 
recognition test participants misattributed the suggested details to the scenes more often than 
they misattributed control items to the scenes (Roediger et al., 2001). It was also observed 
that when the false memory did occur, the participant was more likely to report that they 
“knew” the suggested item was in the scenes rather than claiming they actually remembered 
seeing it (Roediger et al., 2001). This outcome is typical in experiments such as the one 
performed.  The reasoning for this has been understood to be related to retrieval from 
semantic memory or global familiarity of the event (Tulving, 1985). Even when participants 
were warned that their partners may have introduced false details, the social contagion effect 
persisted. (Meade & Roediger, 2002). This data is able to support the idea that false 
memories are able to be transmitted between people via the social contagion of memories.  
 Several factors have been shown to moderate false memory in variations of the social 
contagion paradigm. For example, Echterhoff et al. (2005) found that when participants were 
explicitly warned before a final memory test that the source providing post-event information 
was untrustworthy or incompetent, the social contagion effect was reduced.  However, in 
organic social interactions outside of the laboratory, eyewitnesses are not given explicit 
warnings about a co-witness’s unreliability. When an eyewitness does not know a co-witness, 
the eyewitness may rely upon indirect social cues to form heuristic judgments about the co-
witness’s credibility and competence. This is important to note for the present study, as the 
participant is making judgement on the confederate during the collaborative recall. The 
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judgement made by the subject is valuable, as it may have impacted their decision on whether 
or not to incorporate the items the confederate recalled. The effects of this were investigated 
in the present study in regard to the cross-race interaction as well as the age of the participant. 
For example, research has shown that people tend to perceive individuals from their in-group 
as more credible and trustworthy than individuals from an out-group (e. g., Doosje, 
Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2006). Andrews and Rapp (2014) examined how in-group 
membership can impact social memory. To investigate this, participants were paired with 
either in-group or out-group confederates who introduced inaccurate information about a co-
witnessed event. In-groups were established by pairing participants with confederates who 
they believed had similar artistic preferences and perceptual processing styles. Andrews and 
Rapp (2014) found that the social contagion effect was reduced when the confederates were 
members of participants’ out-groups. Similarly, co-witness pairs who know one another may 
be perceived as more trustworthy and credible. This may increase the social contagion effect. 
For example, French, Garry, and Mori (2008) found that romantic partners who unknowingly 
exposed one another to false information about a witnessed event during a collaborative 
memory test reported more false details on a later independent memory test compared to co-
witness pairs who were strangers. 
 In addition to attempting to understand how various elements of the social interaction 
might affect the perceived credibility of the confederate and influence the social contagion 
effect, prior research has also explored the underlying cognitive and neurological 
mechanisms that could be involved in making these types of memory errors. In order for the 
social contagion effect to be avoided, people must be able to engage in executive control. 
When drawing on memories of prior experiences, memory theorists have made an important 
distinction between two ways that this occurs. One way includes the recollection of 
contextual details that surround a previous encounter with a stimulus, otherwise known as 
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source memory. The second way is a general sense of familiarity that allows one to determine 
whether the stimulus was previously encountered (Dobbins et al., 2002). In everyday life, it is 
common to experience item memory combined with source memory failure. This 
combination plays a valuable role in faulty eyewitness identification.  
The Source Monitoring Framework 
The social contagion effect, and results from studies employing other eyewitness 
memory paradigms, can be interpreted within the source monitoring framework that Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, and Lindsay (1993) present. An important concept that each subject engages in 
when participating in the present study is source monitoring. The ability to identify the source 
of a memory is critical for many cognitive tasks. The participants of the present study engage 
in this task when they perform the final recall and recognition tasks and have to distinguish 
between the sources of their memories. If the participant is unable to do so correctly, it results 
in an error. Source monitoring relates to the conditions or source under which a memory is 
acquired, such as the social context of the event (Johnson et al., 1993). The source-
monitoring hypothesis suggests that the criteria used by the subjects to attribute a memory to 
a particular source will vary with factors such as the purpose of the memory, any present 
biases or the importance of the material (Johnson et al., 1993).  The concept refers to the 
processes that are involved in making connections about the origins of memories, knowledge 
or beliefs. This is especially relevant in laboratory studies, where the participant needs to 
differentiate between items they recognize or recall from a studied scene. When an individual 
is unable to specify source information, they may have difficulty in a simple task such as 
remembering whether the person you are about to tell a joke is the one who originally told 
you the joke to begin with (Johnson et al., 1993).  
The relationship between source monitoring and recognition are seen to be drawn 
from the same heuristic and systematic processes. This is because both the non-studied and 
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studied words on recognition tasks are often familiar to the subjects from sources outside of 
the experiment. Due to this, recognition judgments often involve a degree of source 
monitoring such that the subjects have to attribute memories of studied items to the studied 
scene (Johnson et al., 1993). The source monitoring framework argues that information from 
various sources can potentially be used in recall and while retrieving information from one’s 
memory, the participant may recall recent information and incorrectly identify its source to 
an earlier event (Roediger et al., 2001). Similarly, in the social contagion paradigm subjects 
recall information about the scenes they recently viewed on the final recall test; however, the 
collaborative recall test with the confederate serves as a possible source of error since the 
confederate has recalled some erroneous information. On the later test, the subject can 
potentially attribute the erroneous reported items to the original scenes, rather than correctly 
attributing it to the confederate (Roediger et al., 2001). The proposed source monitoring 
framework predicts that the more closely related the confederate’s statements are to the 
original scene, the more likely the social contagion effect will occur and vice versa (Johnson 
et al., 1993; Roediger et al., 2001).  
Source monitoring has also been examined in relation to age-related deficits, which is 
of importance in the present study. One theoretical account of memory for source information 
is the reality monitoring model proposed by Johnson and Raye (1981). This model is a set of 
processes that is interested in discriminating between externally derived and internally 
generated information within one’s memory (Johnson & Raye, 1981). Externally derived 
memories are those that consist of sensory information, such as color, while internally 
generated memories are more based on the information about the cognitive operations that 
are involved when the memory was established (Hashtroudi et al., 1989).  
            The study that was performed by Hashtroudi et al., (1989) used the reality monitoring 
framework to examine source monitoring in older adults. The main objective was whether 
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older adults generally have a deficit in remembering the source of information or whether age 
deficits limit the types of source monitoring. To test this, subjects were given a list of words 
that came from a variety of different sources. After studying the words and engaging in 
various tasks, they were given a memory test where they had to indicate the source of the 
item (Hashtroudi et al., 1989). The results of the experiment showed that older adults were 
able to discriminate between internally-generated and externally derived memories, but also 
led to the indication that older adults have a specific rather than general deficit in 
remembering the source of information (Hashtroudi et al., 1989). Instead, older adults 
showed deficits in discriminating between memories of the same class, which include 
external and internal source monitoring.  
            The reality monitoring model suggests that these age deficits may occur for two 
different reasons. The first reasoning suggests that older adults may have difficulty with the 
critical information dimensions that discriminate between memories. Secondly, there may be 
an age deficit in the processes that involve reasoning or judgment. Importantly, these results 
suggest that the deficit that older adults have in source monitoring may be correlated on the 
importance of sensory and cognitive operations that are involved when specifying the source 
of a memory (Hashtroudi et al., 1989).  
The Present Study 
 The primary goal of the present study was to explore some of the factors that may 
lead individuals to be more or less susceptible to external suggestions in the social contagion 
of memory paradigm. Specifically, I examined two factors that can influence the social 
context in which suggestions are delivered in the paradigm. The first was the age of the 
participant and the second was the racial group status of confederate used to deliver 
suggestions. In regard to the age component of the experiment, it was hypothesized that older 
adults would demonstrate greater false memory on both recognition and recall tests when 
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compared to young adults. It was further hypothesized that white participants will be less 
susceptible to misleading information presented by members of a racial out-group compared 
to members of a racial in-group. It was also suspected that this effect of co-witness race 
would be more evident in older adult participants, since this generation may maintain 
stronger racial biased compared to young adults. A secondary aim of the study was to 
examine whether age groups would differ in their level of executive functioning by having 
the participants perform the Stroop Task. This task was of importance since it was able to 
give a brief estimate of the individuals ability, since episodic memory and source monitoring 




 There were a total of 69 participants, 34 in the young adult group and 35 in the older 
adult group. The young adult participants were gathered from the Assumption College 
undergraduate students and the participants from the older adult group were gathered from 
the Worcester community. The young adults varied in age from 18-24 and the older adults 
were aged 60+. Of the young adults who participated, 79% were female and 21% were male. 
Additionally, 74% identified as White, 15% as Black, 9% as other and 3% as Asian. Of these 
participants, 80% identified as non-Hispanic and 15% classified as Hispanic. Of the older 
adults who participated, 69% were female and 31% were male and all of these subjects 
classified as white and 91% classified as non-Hispanic.  
 
Materials and Procedure 
 The experimental procedure was the same for both young and older adults. Following 
the consent procedure, participants first completed the first phase of the social memory task. 
This task involved participants observing an original event. The stimuli for this event 
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included pictures of neutral household scenes such as a kitchen and office. The household 
images were taken from Meade and Roediger (2002).  
After the participant completed the study phase, they filled a four minute retention 
interval by completing a brief demographic questionnaire and a brief measure of verbal 
fluency (Benton et al., 1994). Immediately following these tasks, they completed the second 
phase of the social memory test. In this phase, they were exposed to misinformation about the 
earlier studied scenes from a ‘co-witness.’ The co-witness was not another live participant, 
however, it was a fictional part of the research procedure. As part of this fictionalized aspect 
of the procedure, participants were told that they were randomly paired with a partner from a 
research session conducted during the previous semester, who had given permission for the 
research team to share information about them and their performance on the upcoming 
memory task with a future partner (the current participant). The participant/fictional co-
witness (FCW) ‘interaction’ consisted of a collaborative recall task. To begin the task, 
participants were presented with packets that contained a 3x5 glossy photograph of the 
partner, as well as the partner’s fictional name and age. Pictures were taken from The 
Chicago Face Database (Ma et al., 2015) and depicted individuals from the chest up against a 
neutral background. Four male faces (two black and two white) were used as partner stimuli. 
Two were chosen from each group to ensure that any observed effects could not be attributed 
to a specific image. The packet also included a set of index cards, that contained fictionalized 
handwritten responses. The participant was informed that these were provided by their 
partner during their earlier research session. Participants were instructed after being prompted 
by the name of a scene (e.g., Kitchen) to take turns with their partner recalling items from the 
scene. Since the fictional partner was not present, the participant was instructed to read aloud 
items that were written down earlier for the partner. The participant alternated between 
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providing their own response, and reading one from an index card, until six responses from 
each individual had been recorded by the researcher.  
Immediately following the collaborative recall task, the participants completed a 
computerized version of the Stroop Color and Word Test, which is a neuropsychological test 
that is used for both experimental and clinical purposes (Stroop, 1935). The task is used to 
assess the ability to inhibit cognitive interference that occurs when the processing of a 
specific stimulus feature impedes the simultaneous processing of a second stimulus (Scarpina 
& Tagini, 2017). The task requires this in order to disengage from automatic processing to 
engage in the task at hand, naming the color, and is commonly used as a behavioral measure 
of executive functioning. In this version of the task, participants were presented with words 
and said aloud the name of the color that the word was printed in as quickly and accurately as 
possible. Voice responses were recorded and time stamped. Thirty-six items were presented 
on a screen, randomized but equally distributed across four font colors: blue, yellow, green, 
and red. A third of the trials, also randomized for each participant, were congruent (BLUE 
presented in blue font).  A third were incongruent (RED presented in blue font). A third were 
control trials, where a neutral stimulus (XXXX) was presented in colored fonts. Accuracy 
and response times were measured. 
Finally participants completed an individual memory test. The memory test consisted 
of two parts. The first part was a free recall test where participants listed as many items as 
they could remember from each scene. They had two minutes per scene to recall. The second 
part was a computerized recognition test where participants were exposed to items from the 
scenes and new items and judged whether they recognized each item from the earlier study 
phase. There were four alternatives that participants had to choose from for each item:  they 
recognized it from the scenes, they recognized it from their partner, they recognized it from 
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both the scene and partner, or they did not recognize the item. Following the final memory 




 Recall accuracy was measured as the average number of items reported that were 
studied in the scenes. It tested their ability to recall different types of scenes. A 2 (partner 
race: same, different) x 2 (age group: young, older) x 2 (item type: contagion, control) mixed 
ANOVA was conducted on recall accuracy. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
age group, F (1, 65) = 28.585, p < .01,  𝜂𝑝
2 = .305. Young adults recalled more words per 
scene (M = 7.3) than older adults (M = 5.3). The main effect of partner race was not 
significant, F (1, 65) = .504, p = .480, nor the interaction effect between the two, F (1, 65) = 
.005, p = .944.   
The within-subjects part of the analysis observed the impact of item type. The 
analysis revealed a significant main effect of item type, F (1, 65) = 4.356, p = .041,  𝜂𝑝
2= 
.063. Recall of items from scenes that accompanied exposure to contagion items (M = 6.180) 
was slightly lower than recall of items from control scenes that did not accompany exposure 
to suggestion (M = 6.500). The interaction effect of item type and partner race approached 
significance, F (1, 65) = 3.352, p = .072. Recall accuracy is presented in Figures 1 and 2.  
False Recall of Contagion Items 
 False recall was defined as the proportion of suggested contagion items recalled. A 2 
(partner race: same, different) x 2 (age group: young, older) x 2 (item type:  control, 
contagion) mixed ANOVA was conducted on false recall. Only the within-subjects main 
effect of item type was significant, F (1, 65) = 56.91, p = .000,  𝜂𝑝
2= .467. The interaction 
effects between item type and each of the between group variables were not significant: item 
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type by age group, F (1,65) = .980, p = .326, item type by partner race, F (1,65) = .128, p = 
0.722, three-way interaction, F (1,65) = .477, p = .492.  
 In terms of between subjects main effects, none were significant: age group, F (1, 65) 
= .067, p = .797, partner race, F (1, 65) = 1.94, p = .169, age group by partner race 




 Recognition accuracy was defined as the proportion of all test trials answered 
correctly by participants. For example, on a trial presenting a suggested item, the correct 
response would be “partner only”. A 2 (partner race:  same, different) x 2 (age group: young, 
older) between-subjects ANOVA was conducted on recognition accuracy.  The analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of age group, F (1, 64) = 10.272, p = .002, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .14. Young 
adults (M = .61) were more accurate than older adults (M = .51).  The main effect of partner 
race was not significant, F (1, 64) = .393, p = .533, nor the interaction effect, F (1, 64) = .010, 
p = .922. Recognition accuracy is presented in Figure 5. 
False Recognition of Contagion Items 
 False recognition was defined as the proportion of test trials where there was any false 
recognition of contagion items, which were the experimental items presented on the note 
cards. Two responses on the recognition test indicated social contagion of memory: first, if a 
contagion item was identified as an item from the ‘scene only’, second, if a contagion item 
was identified as an item from ‘both the scene and the partner’s note cards’. A 2 (partner 
race: same, different) x 2 (age group: young, older) x 2 (type of error made: scene only, 
partner and scene) mixed ANOVA was conducted on false recognition. The analysis revealed 
a significant main effect of age group, F (1, 64) = 4.457, p = 0.039,  𝜂𝑝
2= 0.065. Young adults 
(M = 0.17) had fewer false memories compared to older adults (M = 0.237). The main effect 
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of partner race was not significant, F (1, 64) = .283, p = 0.597, nor the interaction effect, F 
(1, 64) = .014, p = .906.  
 The only within-subjects main effect was error type, F (1, 64) = 16.026, p = <.01,    
𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.200. Participants more often reported that the source of suggested items was both the 
partner and the scenes ((M = .280) compared to the scenes only (M = .122). The interaction 
effect of error type and age group was not significant, F (1, 64) = .166, p = .685, nor the 
interaction effect of error type and partner race, F (1, 64) = .218, p = .642, nor the interaction 
effect between error type, age group and partner race, F (1, 64) = .009, p = .925. False 
recognition is presented in Figures 6 and 7.  
Stroop Interference 
 Reaction times to name each color were measured as the time between the onset of 
the visual stimulus and the beginning of the participant’s speech response.  Only trials that 
participants responded to correctly were included in the interference analysis.  Stroop 
interference was calculated as the average reaction time to incongruent trials minus average 
reaction time to neutral trials. A 2 (partner race: same, different) x 2 (age group: young, 
older) between-subjects ANOVA was conducted on interference scores.  The main effect of 
age group was significant. Older adults (M = 319.8) demonstrated greater Stroop interference 
compared to younger adults (M = 175.2), F (1, 64) = 22.52, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .26. The main 
effect of partner race was not significant, F (1, 64) = .022, p = .882, nor the interaction effect, 
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Discussion 
The main objective of this present study was to investigate how the social dynamic of 
a cross-group interaction may influence eyewitness memory. Although there are several 
studies that have been done to research the misinformation effect and the social contagion 
paradigm, there has not been any done that study the impact of cross-race interactions. Thus, 
this study observed whether racial bias had the ability to alter whether or not individuals 
would incorporate information into their original memory. In addition, the study observed 
whether or not older adults or younger adults are more susceptible to forming false memories 
in hopes of better understanding methods to potentially reduce these incidents from 
occurring.  
Importantly, a standard misinformation effect was demonstrated in the data. This 
means that participants were less accurate on final test trials that had been targeted with 
misinformation when compared to neutral trials. Also supporting the original hypothesis was 
the finding that young adults demonstrated better performance on a number of the measure of 
memory, including recall accuracy, recognition accuracy, and false recognition. The Stroop 
task also demonstrated that older adults are more susceptible to interference effects on the 
task than young adults. However, contrary to the original hypothesis, there was no significant 
difference in participants with same racial partners having greater false memory.  
While there were not significant results that demonstrated racial bias, it is important 
to take note that some of the tests may have been underpowered. The test that showed results 
that were close to a significant value for the hypothesis of participants with same race 
partners having greater false memory was the recall accuracy test. The value of p = .072 was 
not significant, but it is possible that the analysis was underpowered. If it were to be a 
potential trend, the data suggests that the participant was paired with a partner of the same 
race, there was not any significant difference between the accurate items recalled when they 
AGE DIFFERENCES IN FALSE MEMORY  26 
 
were presented with both control and contagion items. However, when both young and old 
adults were paired with Black partners, they recalled fewer contagion items than with the 
control items. These results suggest that people with different race partners may result in a 
negative impact by misinformation more than people who are given White partners.  
Another interesting finding that was observed was that the results of the present study 
showed an age difference on recognition, however, there was no age difference in recall. This 
result is one that typically goes against past research studies (e.g. Meade & Roediger, 2002). 
One possible explanation to this may be because recall is a more difficult retrieval process. 
When someone is engaging in recall, they have to use a more evaluative process based on 
recollection rather than familiarity. Due to this, it is not the same retrieval process that occurs 
during a recognition task. In a recognition task, the participant has the ability to rely on 
familiarity. When the participant mistakes familiarity for recollection, it causes an error. In 
order to further investigate these results, more participants will have to be collected to better 
understand and interpret the findings.  
The fallibility of one’s memory has led to a lot of attention from both the media and 
researchers. The initial paradigm of the misinformation effect was able to demonstrate how 
individuals frequently report experiencing incorrect information into the original event, when 
these details never occurred (Loftus et al., 1978). The concern arose due to the effect being 
detrimental in situations where memory accuracy is of extreme value, such as eyewitness 
testimony. Due to this, it has caused researchers to investigate further into memory in order to 
identify potential procedures to reduce misinformation effects (Huff et al., 2013). Research 
has led to the understanding of possible sources of error that lead to the social contagion 
effect, such as source monitoring (Johnson et al., 1993). The identification of these errors has 
led to researchers telling participants to focus on the source information during the test and 
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also warning participants about misinformation (Huff et al., 2013; Chambers & Zaragoza, 
2001).  
In a recent experiment done by Huff, Davis & Meade (2013), they explored an 
additional method to protect an individual’s memory from misleading details. When 
improving memory performance, the use of testing has been extensively researched. The 
research has led to the verbal-learning literature demonstrating a consistent improvement in 
memory when participants completed additional tests, called hypermnesia (Huff et al., 2013; 
Erdelyi & Becker, 1974). Another coined term is the testing effect, which refers to the 
increase in correct memory for participants who are tested instead of additional study 
(Karpicke & Roediger, 2008). Of interest was whether initial testing also would benefit false 
memory. This idea produced the question of whether completing a memory test before one 
receives misinformation would enhance memory for the event thereby reducing 
misinformation effects (Huff et al., 2013).  
This hypothesis was supported from early work, such as experiments done by Loftus 
(1977). This experiment included participants viewing a green car driving past an accident 
scene. The results demonstrated that participants were less likely to report misinformation 
when they were initially tested on the color of the car before they received misinformation, 
such as the car was blue (Huff et al., 2013; Loftus, 1977). These results were further 
supported by an unpublished study that Loftus did (1979) where participants who completed 
a free recall test before they were exposed to misinformation had fewer false memory items 
on the final test compared to those who did not complete this initial test (Huff et al., 2013). 
With this evidence, there are also researchers that have shown that initial testing can increase 
the potential for the subject to incorporate details from misinformation. A study done by 
Chan and colleagues (Chan et al., 2009) also investigated this idea but discovered results that 
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showed heightened false memory, later referred to as retrieval enhanced suggestibility (RES) 
(Huff et al., 2013).  
Huff, Davis and Meade (2013) extended previous research on initial testing and 
misinformation effects by exploring it in the context of the social contagion paradigm. The 
main findings of the experiment demonstrated that whether the participant was initially tested 
or not did not have an impact on the formation of an RES effect or a protective effect from 
incorporating false details (Huff et al., 2013). With this, a second experiment was performed 
where the researchers replicated the social contagion paradigm, however; the participants 
were now given corrective feedback on their initial recall tests (Huff et al., 2013). The results 
of this piece of the study demonstrated that this alteration produced the same rates of false 
recall of contagion items on a final test. Overall, the study revealed that initial testing did not 
provide protection against misinformation on a final source-monitoring recognition test. 
Critically, however, participants who completed the initial test were deemed less likely to 
falsely attribute contagion items to the scenes (Huff et al., 2013).  The results also gave 
suggestion that the protective effect that the initial testing provided was only directed towards 
the source recognition test since the instructions for the test indicated strong attention to the 
item’s source (Huff et al., 2013). The conclusion of the testing to avoid false memories led to 
the suggestion of initial testing in the social contagion paradigm, however, it depends on the 
type of test that is given.  
The present study was limited in a few regards. The first area that showed limitation 
was the lack of diversity, as the young adult participants were all undergraduate students at 
Assumption College. Due to this, it is possible that a lot of the students come from similar 
backgrounds. The older adults were also relatively homogenous. Also, a large limitation of 
the study was that it interfered with the current global pandemic of COVID-19, therefore 
halting the experiment and reducing the number of participants. Despite some limitations that 
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arose during the study, the data revealed some interesting results that will spark further 
inquiry. For example, it would be interesting to further investigate the cross-racial interaction 
component of the study and expand it to individuals from other places than the Worcester 
community. One option that would greatly expand the study is turning it into a virtual 
experiment where people from all around the United States could participate. In order to do 
this, the confederate used in the experiment would have to be made virtual, along with other 
aspects of the protocol. Expanding the study to other parts of the world would be fascinating 
to see how all of these variables interact based on their global location.   
In regard to better understanding memory, neuroimaging will also be of significant 
help to better understand the biological components of memory impairment with age. There 
has been considerable attention given to ways one can improve their memory as they age, 
such as cognitive training, in order to provide a boost to their cognitive function with the 
hopes of delaying the onset of memory decline (Park & Festini, 2017). There have been 
investigations that observe if there are increases in episodic memory in older adults who have 
learned new skills, such as digital photography or working an iPad (Park et al., 2014). Park 
and colleagues (2014) investigated whether sustained engagement in learning new skills 
would lead to activated working memory, episodic memory, and reasoning, thereby 
enhancing cognitive function in older adults.  
Another scientific way that is being investigated for future use is neurostimulation. 
This concept is a possible method of enhancing memory. Researchers have recently been 
examining the influence of a non-invasive technique, known as transcranial direct current 
stimulation. There have already been results showing benefits of this procedure in young 
adults and a few older adults (Park & Festini, 2017). One study was able to provide improved 
verbal recognition memory in Alzheimer’s patients following the procedure. Further research 
will be necessary on this topic, but it is of interest as a possibility to prevent memory decline.  
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In sum, this study added an important piece to beginning to understand the factors that 
influence the social contagion of memory effect, particularly factors that influence the social 
aspect of the participant-confederate interaction. In addition to age and race, it may also be of 
interest in future work to consider variables such as intelligence, lifestyle, and genetic 
background. I think that these variables are of importance when it comes to an individual’s 
ability to engage in proper executive functioning and may also lead to further discovery about 
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False Recall for Young Adults as a Function of Item Type and Partner Race 
 
 


































False Recall for Older Adults as a Function of Item Type and Partner Race 
 
 











































































False Recognition in Young Adults as a Function of Error Type and Partner Race 
 
 














































































Note. Error bars show standard error. 
